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I. INTRODUCTION
Under general conflict of laws rules, a claim validly created in one
state will be enforced in the courts of any other state.' Uniformity of
law and cooperation of the states are best served by the recognition of this
general rule. As stated by Goodrich, "because our entire economic and
industrial system is based on the need for performing agreements, this
protection of justified expectations responds to the need for certainty,
predictability and commercial convenience."'
An exception to this general rule of enforcement arises where the
claim sought to be enforced violates the strong public policy of the forum.'
This Comment explores the use of this exception in refusing recognition
of a contract for the payment of a gambling debt incurred in a jurisdic-
tion where this type of contract is both valid and enforceable.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Gambling is probably as old as man himself.4 It is "an inevitable
concomitant of man's basic culture patterns."5 The identification of prim-
itive religion with gambling as well as its mention in the Bible further
exemplify man's historical preoccupation with games of chance.' Pro-
fessor Ehrenzweig's statement is therefore not surprising that "at common
law gambling was neither illegal nor considered immoral."'
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
2. H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 200 (4th ed. 1964).
3. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934).
4. "The most primitive aboriginals of the western hemisphere had crude dice and
gambled on 'bowl' games." 9 ENCYC. BRITANNICA 998 (1959).
5. Id.
6. "The Hebrews cast lots before the Lord (Joshua xviii, 10), but the Lord decided
(Proverbs xvi, 33)." 9 ENCYC. BRITANNICA 998 (1959).
7. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 482 (1962). But see West Indies v. First Natl
Bank, 67 Nev. 13, 214 P.2d 144 (1950).
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Gambling pursuits naturally result in monetary obligations. Society
has frowned upon much of this gambling and legislation preventing
enforcement of various forms of gambling obligations has been enacted.'
Under these circumstances, it would seem natural that this propensity to
gamble, available as a legal form of entertainment in some jurisdictions,'
would eventually create many situations where courts would be con-
fronted with debts which were valid where incurred, yet void under the
law of the forum. Surprisingly, there is little in the way of scholarly
discussion in this area. Perhaps most writers agree with Rabel's state-
ment concerning the enforceability of foreign debts validly incurred
while participating in legal casino gambling: "Whether really much
authority is available, seems doubtful; however, games of chance indeed
are not worthy of serious judicial consideration, nor of scholarly dis-
cussion."' 1 However, as more Americans become members of the "affluent
society" with leisure time and the opportunity to travel to legalized
gambling areas this problem will undoubtedly become more prevalent.
III. GENERAL TREND
The modern trend is best exemplified by the New York case of
Intercontinental Hotels Corp. (P.R.) v. Golden."' In this case, a valid
obligation to pay gambling debts was created in Puerto Rico where such
debts are legal and enforceable.'2 Enforcement of this obligation was
sought in the New York courts. Since New York had not legalized casino
gambling and held such gambling contracts void, the primary issue con-
fronting the court was whether such an obligation was unenforceable as
contrary to the public policy of the forum. The New York court used
normal conflict of law rules, applied the law of Puerto Rico, and held
that in the absence of a clear showing that the enforcement of the cause
of action would offend a sense of justice or menace the public welfare
the forum should not refuse to enforce the contractual obligation.3 The
court felt that although this contract would be void if incurred in New
York, enforcement by New York of this validly-created obligation would
not offend the public policy of the state. The court found the gambling
from which the debt arose to be licensed by the territory of Puerto Rico
and stated:
Informed public sentiment in New York is only against un-
licensed gambling, which is unsupervised, unregulated by law
and which affords no protection to customers and no assurance
of fairness or honesty in the operation of the gambling devices.' 4
8. FLA. STAT. § 849.26 (1967).
9. Notably Nevada, Puerto Rico, Freeport, and Lucaya.
10. 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 573 (2d ed. 1960).
11. 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964).
12. 31 LAWS P.R. ANN. § 4774 (1956).
13. 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1964).
14. Id. at 15, 203 N.E.2d at 213, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 529.
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An earlier New York case also chose to use the law of the place where
the contract was executed to enforce a gambling debt incurred in Cuba.' 5
One federal court has also followed this more lenient approach. In
Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. McMahon,"S although recognizing that gambling
was prohibited in Oklahoma, the federal court sitting in that state en-
forced the payment of notes executed in Haiti which were given in con-
sideration for the purchase of a gambling casino. The court found that
gambling was legal in the Republic of Haiti.
The more modern approach seems to recognize that these debts are
incurred where they are entirely legal and where the gambling involved
is sanctioned by the government. To allow one to incur such a debt and
then, safe in his home jurisdiction, to renege on his validly assumed obli-
gations would be an unjust benefit to the defendant.' The courts are
reluctant to allow the defendant to assert a violation of public policy
to avoid legally incurred debts.
IV. FLORMA POSITION
The cases of Young v. Sands, Inc.' and Dorado Beach Hotel Corp.
v. Jernigan"9 exemplify the Florida position on the question of whether
the enforcement of foreign gambling debts validly incurred would be
against the public policy of the state.
Young v. Sands, Inc. involved a Nevada gambling debt sought to
be enforced in the Florida courts. The District Court of Appeal, Third
District felt that a Florida statute which declared such gambling debts
void was a conclusive reflection of the public policy of the state and any
enforcement of such debts would be in violation of this policy. Section
849.26 of the Florida Statutes provides:
All promises, agreements, notes, bills, bonds or other contracts,
mortgages or other securities, when the whole or part of the
consideration if for money or other valuable thing won or lost,
laid, staked, betted or wagered in any gambling transaction
whatsoever, regardless of its name or nature, whether hereto-
fore prohibited or not or for the repayment of money lent or
advanced at the time of a gambling transaction for the purpose
of being laid, betted, staked or wagered are void and of no
effect; provided, that this act shall not apply to wagering on
parimutuals or any gambling transaction expressly authorized
by law.'
15. Tropicales, S.A. v. Drinkhouse, 15 Misc.2d 425, 183 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
16. 217 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Okla. 1963).
17. See RESTATEMENT, CONFICT Or LAWS § 612, comment c (1934); H. GOODRICH,
CoNFLIT Or LAWS 198 (4th ed. 1964).
18. 122 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
19. 202 So.2d 830 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1967).
20. FLA. STAT. § 849.26 (1967).
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It is submitted that this statute itself clearly states that its provisions
do not apply to "any gambling transaction expressly authorized by law."
Thus, if we are to accept this statute as a reflection of public policy it
seems that the enforcement of a gambling transaction which took place
in Nevada, where it was authorized by law, would not be contrary to the
public policy of Florida.
Although the writer does not agree that this Florida statute reflects
a public policy opposed to enforcement of gambling debts incurred in
states where such gambling is licensed by state law, it is submitted that
the court in the Young case still reached the proper result. Although
Nevada law allows legalized gambling, there are no provisions for enforc-
ing debts incurred in this manner and the Nevada courts have refused
to enforce legal gambling debts.2 Thus, the Florida court's judgment
would have been the same even if it had applied the law of Nevada. It
is submitted, however, that the application of Nevada law would have
been the proper approach.
In the second case, Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jernigan, the
District Court of Appeal, First District did not rely upon Florida
Statutes, section 849.26 but rather attempted to articulate the public
policy of Florida regarding gambling contracts. The court felt that the
public policy of the state permits "a restricted type of gambling which
is incidental to spectator sports."22 The plaintiff wanted Florida to enforce
a valid gambling obligation incurred in Puerto Rico. The court held that
the public policy of Florida would not allow such enforcement and
that it was Florida's policy that the only forms of gambling made legal
are "contests staged for those seeking pleasure in the State-primarily
tourists.12 3 The court's attempted definition of Florida public policy will
be discussed in depth in a later section.
It is submitted that the laws of Puerto Rico should have been
applied in Jernigan, and that since Puerto Rican law does allow enforce-
ment of gambling debts, 4 the obligation should have been enforced. The
gambling involved in this case was licensed by the Puerto Rican govern-
ment. Consequently, it does not seem that such gambling contracts
should be held as against the public policy of the forum. The fact that
Puerto Rican law also allows the court discretion in lowering the amount
of loss 25 should make the recognition of Puerto Rican law even more
acceptable to the forum. Public policy arguments should not be effective
as a defense against enforcement of this cause of action.
21. Weisbrod v. Fremont Hotel, Inc., 74 Nev. 227, 326 P.2d 1104 (1958); West Indies
v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 Nev. 13, 214 P.2d 144 (1950); see also Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc.
v. Gibson, 77 Nev. 25, 359 P.2d 85 (1961).
22. 202 So.2d 830, 831 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
23. Id. at 831.
24. 31 LAWS P.R. ANN. § 4474 (1956).
25. Id.
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V. VALID GAMBLING OBLIGATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY
The primary consideration in a court's refusal to apply the laws of a
foreign jurisdiction in these gambling cases is the forum's public policy.
We have seen that if a court feels such obligations are contrary to its
public policy it will choose not to enforce the contract. Hence, this leaves
us with the difficult determination of when the enforcement of a certain
obligation will violate the public policy of the forum.
Justice Cardozo has stated that to refuse enforcement because of
public policy a cause of action must "violate some fundamental principle
of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal."26 In this connection, the very strong
public policy supporting the enforcement of contractual obligations should
be noted." As stated by Goodrich:
There is much to be said for a policy of enforcing obligations
deliberately contracted and legally entered into. A paramount
public policy in a day of easy communication and unlimited
international and interstate business is the uniform interstate
enforcement of contractual undertakings. A refusal to enforce
the valid foreign contract makes the forum a sanctuary for
those seeking to avoid their legal obligation.2
Courts which have dealt with the elusive question of public policy
will deny enforcement after applying the test of whether the action will
be prejudicial to the standards of morality or the general interest of the
forum's citizens.29 Rabel states: "In the soundest decisions, the exception
of public policy, in fact, is reduced to the function of an objectively
ascertained moral sense."'
It should be noted that the gambling obligations involved in this
problem were incurred in jurisdictions where such contracts are legal.
In light of this, it should be difficult for a forum to hold that such obliga-
tions are against its public policy:
It is hard to think of many transactions which have the stamp
of approval of the law of some civilized state upon them which
reek so of immorality that to give a money judgment upon the
claim will jeopardize the ethnical standards of the forum. For
one state of the union to assume such an attitude with regard
to a contract centered in another seems an intolerable, provincial
affectation of virtue."'
26. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
27. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612, comment c (1934).
28. H. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 199 (4th ed. 1964).
29. Dennick v. Railroad, 103 U.S. 11 (1880); Powell v. Great N. Ry., 102 Minn. 448,
113 N.W. 1017 (1907); Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413
(1883) ; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
30. 2 E. RABEL, supra note 11, at 576.
31. H. GOODRICH, supra note 30, at 198.
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VI. FLORIDA PUBLIC POLICY
Young v. Sands, Inc. 2 and Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jernigan88
demonstrate that contracts based on gambling transactions will be un-
enforceable in Florida since they are against the state's public policy.
What is determinative of when a contract is against Florida public
policy? Justice Terrell, although recognizing that no standard rule can
be fixed, stated that "a contract is not void for public policy unless it is
injurious to the public or contravenes some settled social interest."34
Justice Buford in his dissent in Knott v. State5 wrestled with a defini-
tion:
[I]t may be said to be community common sense and common
conscience extended and applied throughout the state to matters
of public morals, public health, public safety, public welfare,
and the like. It is that general and well settled public opinion
relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow men, having
due regard to all the circumstances of each particular relation
and situation.
Since the Sands and Jernigan cases involved gambling obligations incurred
where such gambling was licensed, it does not appear that enforcement
of such obligation would be "injurious to the public" or "contravene
some social interest." The enforcement of valid gambling obligations
would not have an adverse effect locally since a court does not break
down local control over local transactions by applying the foreign law
to decide a foreign contract.86
Florida courts have pronounced a "strong adherence to the common
law principle of the freedom of contract. '3 7 Yet Young v. Sands, Inc. has
declared that because there is a statute which provides that contracts
made involving forms of casino gambling are void, this reflects a public
policy not to enforce such contracts although validly created. Statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and a mere
difference between state statutes does not make a cause of action con-
trary to public policy.88 Justice Cardozo has recognized that "a right of
action is property. If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact that
we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in
getting what belongs to him.""9
32. 122 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
33. 202 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
34. Russell v. Martin, 88 So.2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1956) (emphasis added).
35. 136 Fla. 184, 191, 186 So. 788, 795 (1939).
36. Paulsen & Sovern, Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 969, 970
(1956).
37. Inland Container Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 266 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1959).
38. Warner v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947); Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); RESTATEMENT, CONFLcT oF LAWS
§ 612, comment b (1934).
39. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 110-11, 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918).
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It is clear that there must not only be a difference in statutes, but
also enforcement of the contract must violate good morals and the public
interest in order for public policy to invalidate it. The intent of Florida
Statutes, section 849.26 was to enforce only licensed gambling transac-
tions. Public policy would be indeed violated if Florida should enforce
unlicensed and unsupervised gambling obligations. On the other hand,
licensed gambling obligations, it is submitted, should be enforced.
The Jernigan decision, in order to define the forms of gambling
which shock the public morals, attempted to distinguish between various
types of licensed gambling, stating that Florida would recognize licensed
spectator sport gambling but not casino gambling. This distinction seems
to be rather weak. For a period of one year between July 1, 1966 and
June 30, 1967, the State of Florida received $40,567,398 from licensed
gambling within the stateA° Gambling, whatever its form, is therefore no
stranger to Florida. The determinative factor in deciding public policy
in Florida should be whether or not the gambling from which the debt
arose was licensed. If licensed, enforcement of the debt should not shock
the public morality.
VII. ENFORCEABILITY OF PUERTO RICAN JUDGMENTS
Assuming that the cause of action in the Jernigan case had been
reduced to judgment in Puerto Rico, there is little doubt that such a
judgment would be enforceable in Florida. Although Puerto Rico is not
a state and thus does not come under the constitutional provision of full
faith and credit, a federal statute assures enforceability of Puerto Rican
judgments:
Such acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof,
so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."1
The statute as applied to Puerto Rican judgments has been held
constitutional and given effect in Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Kaplus.42 Clearly, the defense of public policy is not available against a
judgment of the territory of Puerto Rico.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that conflict of laws rules should be applied in situa-
tions involving gambling obligations incurred where such gaming is legal.
The forum should use the law of the lex loci actus to determine liability
40. 1967 FLA. STATE RACING COMM'N ANN. REP. 17.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964).
42. 368 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1966).
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in this case. The forum's public policy should not stand in the way of
the enforcement of the foreign law, especially in light of the fact that
some jurisdictions do not hesitate to enforce validly incurred foreign
gambling debts. Refusal of enforcement is "particularly unfortunate
where evasion of the forum's prohibitions can be easily achieved by
recovering a judgment on the prohibited contract in a state with more
lenient standards.
' 43
In most instances, gambling is closely supervised and licensed by the
respective state or territory in which the gambling debt is incurred. Con-
tracts which result from these pursuits should not shock the morals of
the enforcing jurisdiction. On the contrary, it seems morally wrong not
to recognize and enforce such obligations. As Professor Bayitch has
stated in discussing the Jernigan case,
[T] here is involved a simple question of basic propriety, namely
whether public policy should condone that an adult, apparently
of some means, who executed a valid check to pay for his pleas-
ures at the licensed gambling tables in another jurisdiction
within the United States may, upon returning to his home in
Florida take the moralistic attitude that what he did was wrong
and, consequently renege on his otherwise valid promise.44
It does not seem that the defense of public policy should provide an
undeserved benefit to one who legally and knowingly enters into an
apparently binding contract. The overriding importance of uniformity of
law and of the freedom of contract should compel the courts to encourage
the enforcement of obligations and avoid an approach which will provide
a sanctuary for those who wish to disavow their legally undertaken
obligations.
43. A. EHRENZWEIG, CoNiucT OF LAWS 487 (1962).
44. Bayitch, Survey of Conflict of Laws, 22 U. MziAi L. REv. 509, 513 (1968).
